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High frequency trading has led to widespread efforts to reduce information propagation delays
between physically distant exchanges. Using relativistically correct millisecond-resolution tick data,
we document a 3-millisecond decrease in one-way communication time between the Chicago and
New York areas that has occurred from April 27th, 2010 to August 17th, 2012. We attribute the
first segment of this decline to the introduction of a latency-optimized fiber optic connection in late
2010. A second phase of latency decrease can be attributed to line-of-sight microwave networks,
operating primarily in the 6-11 GHz region of the spectrum, licensed during 2011 and 2012. Using
publicly available information, we estimate these networks’ latencies and bandwidths. We estimate
the total infrastructure and 5-year operations costs associated with these latency improvements to
exceed $500 million.
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 1, 1949, AT&T augmented its “Long
Lines” telephone service between New York City and
Chicago with a 34-hop line-of-sight 4 GHz microwave ra-
dio relay. The 838-mile route traversed six states, and
carried voice and television traffic between endpoint ter-
minals located on AT&T’s New York City central office
building, and the Congress Street Telephone Building in
Chicago. The New York to Chicago segment was part of
a larger 106-hop transcontinental microwave relay that
linked Chicago to Denver and San Francisco, and which
cost $40 million to construct [9].
Historically, new technologies, such as the principles of
radio communication underlying AT&T’s network, have
been rapidly adopted for the advantage of participants in
financial markets. From 1847 through 1851, Paul Reuter
employed carrier pigeons between Brussels and Aachen
to bridge a gap in telegraph stations on the route con-
necting Berlin to Paris, thereby providing a low-latency
data feed for market-moving events [18]. In 1865, the fi-
nancier James Fisk completed a purpose-built telegraph
line to Halifax in order to signal a fast steamship to cross
the Atlantic with instructions to short Confederate bonds
at the close of the U.S. Civil War [24]. One of Thomas
A. Edison’s best known inventions was the stock ticker,
which transmitted market pricing information using the
then newly practical transmission of information by tele-
graph.
In recent years, Moore’s law has driven computeriza-
tion of the financial exchanges, with an attendant de-
crease in trading latency, and a strong growth in auto-
mated, algorithmic trading. The speed of trading has
entered the special relativistic regime, in which speed-
of-light related delays are a significant factor. Algorith-
mic strategies are now routinely controlled by computer
servers that are physically co-located at the exchanges.
Substantial effort and expense are invested in speeding
up the trading pipeline; end-to-end latencies between or-
der generation from strategy servers to order fulfillment
and confirmation from the exchange matching engines
are now measured in microseconds or less. Exchange
data (such as the NASDAQ Itch 4.1 tick data analyzed
here) are time-stamped to the nanosecond. Indeed, if la-
tencies continue to decrease at the current exponential
rate, it is a matter of a mere one to two decades before
novel general relativistic effects associated with time di-
lation in the gravitational potential will begin to assume
importance. For a further discussion of asset pricing in
relativistic contexts, see [6].
The relatively new practice of high frequency trading
(HFT) is controversial and complex [27]. It is also per-
vasive, profitable, and secretive. HFT – loosely defined
as computerized trading of financial instruments, gener-
ally with the intention of holding instruments for short
time periods, and subject to conditions computed by an
algorithmic driver – has been estimated to account for
between fifty and eighty percent of executed volume on
United States equity exchanges, even though it is prac-
ticed by fewer than two percent of all registered trading
firms [11, 14, 16]. Historically, high frequency traders
have captured significant risk-adjusted returns [4], but
industry-wide estimates of HFT revenues are highly vari-
able and have been trending downward.
For 2009, considered a peak year for industry prof-
itability, estimates ranged from $7.2 billion to $25 bil-
lion [14, 20, 25]. A leading market analyst suggests that
increased competition and lower trading volume have
caused a significant decline in HFT industry revenues
from $7.2 billion in 2009 to $1.8 billion in 2012 [25].
Other estimates suggest 2012 profits of no more than
$1.25 billion for the industry as a whole [17]. If we assume
that HF traders in aggregate capture a non-negligible
fraction, fc, of the minimum $0.01 bid-offer spread on all
US equity trades, then the yearly equity-trading profits,
P , for the HFT industry, given an average traded daily
volume, V , are
P = fc
(
V
5× 109 shares day−1
)
× $12.5 billion .
2Typical daily volumes were V = 1× 1010 shares day−1 in
2009 [17], but have declined to V . 5× 109 shares day−1
by the second half of 20121. In addition, as estimated
via trading volumes and minimum bid-offer spreads, eq-
uity options and equity futures trading supply additional
revenues that sum to ∼ 1/3 of those generated by stock
transactions.
While academic research analyzing HFT has expanded
substantially in recent years (see, e.g. bibliographies and
literature reviews in [3, 21]) details regarding the precise
algorithms, trading strategies, and technologies deployed
by high frequency traders, as well as the costs of im-
plementing these strategies, remain scarce. This article
draws on the quantitative analysis of publicly available
data to strip away a portion of the secrecy that relates
to two very specific forms of high frequency trading: eq-
uity market-making and liquidity-taking algorithms that
rely on access to high speed information regarding fu-
tures market equity index price formation at a geograph-
ically distant exchange. The literature has long estab-
lished that equity futures prices formed in Chicago lead
cash prices formed in the US equity markets, which now,
as a practical matter, reside in the exchange’s match-
ing engines housed at various data centers in suburban
New Jersey. Many algorithmic traders with computers
co-located at equity market trading facilities in New Jer-
sey thus value low-latency access to price information
emanating from Chicago, and in recent years, latencies
dictated by the speed of light, both within and between
exchanges, have become important. As detailed below,
our analysis indicates that for the past two years, 20% of
all trading in the highly liquid SPY ETF can be specif-
ically identified to occur in direct response to changes
in the traded price of the near-month E-mini S&P 500
futures contract.2
Our approach is twofold. First, we use the latency
structure of inter-exchange communication – as expressed
in historical tick data – as a quantitative tool to monitor
the operation of a specific class of HFT algorithms. For
558 trading days, we correlate movements in the near-
month E-Mini S&P 500 futures contract, traded on the
CME in the Chicago area, with response by the SPY and
other equity order books at the NASDAQ and other New
Jersey-based exchanges. As the CME orders are time-
stamped to millisecond (ms) precision using the globally
synchronized GPS-established time frame, we can mea-
sure end-to-end latencies and document high frequency
cash equity market reactions to small exogenous futures
market price shocks.
Second, we document both the technology and the re-
cent development of an ultra-low latency communication
1 2012 volumes: http://www.batstrading.com/market summary/
2 It is interesting to note that of order ∼ 104 such trades occur
daily; this is just ∼ 2×104 bits of information in the 6.5 hours of
the trading day, giving a data rate, 〈r〉 ∼ 1 bit s−1, not dissimilar
to that of Edison’s stock ticker.
infrastructure that is used to transmit information be-
tween the market centers in the metropolitan Chicago
and New Jersey/New York areas.
We find that the cutting-edge method used to commu-
nicate financial information from Chicago to New Jer-
sey has recently progressed through three distinct stages.
Our analysis of the market data confirms that as of April,
2010, the fastest communication route connecting the
Chicago futures markets to the New Jersey equity mar-
kets was through fiber optic lines that allowed equity
prices to respond within 7.25-7.95 ms of a price change
in Chicago [1]. In August of 2010, Spread Networks in-
troduced a new fiber optic line that was shorter than
the pre-existing routes and used lower latency equipment.
This technology reduced Chicago-New Jersey latency to
approximately 6.65 ms [1, 23].
Beginning in approximately March of 2011, the data
indicate a further progressive (∼ 2ms) decline in inter-
market response latency that we attribute to two factors.
The first factor is the deployment of custom-built mi-
crowave communications networks which take advantage
of the greater speed of light through air than through
glass, and can reduce the inter-market latency by up
to approximately 2.5 ms relative to the best available
fiber technology. Using FCC records and other data,
we document the licensing of at least 15 custom mi-
crowave networks between Chicago and the New York
area and estimate their latencies to fall in the 4.2-5.2
ms range. Our analysis indicates, however, that most of
these links are far from optimally designed, taking far
more hops and less direct routes than necessary given
available radio hardware and existing towers; this sub-
optimal design adds both latency and cost. With respect
to the better designed links, we expect that additional
improvements in microwave routing and technology to
reduce inter-market latency to approximately 4.03 ms,
or 0.1 ms above the minimal 3.93 ms speed-of-light la-
tency. At that point, further latency improvement may
become prohibitively expensive and difficult, and factors
other than long-distance latency, such as “last mile” costs
and latencies, bandwidth, and link reliability, may begin
to dominate over the speed at which information flows
between the two markets.
A second factor is the possible evolution of predictive
algorithms that statistically anticipate Chicago futures
price changes before that information can reach the eq-
uity market engines. We observe a signal consistent with
the emergence of such algorithms by documenting corre-
lations that occur over timescales shorter than the the-
oretical limit of 3.93 ms for light to travel between the
Chicago futures market and the New Jersey data cen-
ters. Alternately, firms that trade simultaneously in ge-
ographically separated markets may coordinate the is-
suance their orders with respect to the GPS time frame.
Such coordinated activity, if it occurs, would make it ap-
pear as if information is traveling between Chicago and
New Jersey at faster than the speed of light.
We are also able to estimate the cost of the investments
3made in order to generate these increased speeds. Spread
Networks fiber optic link is estimated in media reports
to have cost approximately $300 million [23], not includ-
ing the additional cost of “lighting” dark fibers. FCC
licensing data, frequency prior-coordination notices, and
industry sources suggest that of order 20 entities are ac-
tively constructing or have already launched microwave
links connecting the Chicago and New Jersey areas; no-
tably, the 15 fully-licensed paths we have reconstructed
constitute of order 1/20th of all microwave miles licensed
over the past two years in the US. At an estimated av-
erage capital cost of $8 million per link, the HFT sector
appears ready to spend an additional aggregate of $160
million to reduce inter-market latency from 6.65 ms to
approximately 4.1 ms, at best. We further estimate that
a relatively small additional expenditure of ∼$5 million
could allow the better designed current microwave net-
works to come within 0.1 ms of the speed-of-light limit
on the Chicago-New Jersey route.
The remainder of this paper is devoted to providing
an in-depth treatment of the foregoing issues. In §II, we
describe our analysis methods for financial tick data and
show how they can be used to provide inter-market la-
tency estimates. In §III, we provide a detailed assessment
of the development and the capabilities of the microwave
networks that have recently been licensed between New
York and Chicago. In §IV, we combine the internal la-
tency measurements from the tick data with the external
measurements from the network analyses to show how
the Chicago to New York latency has evolved during the
past 2.5 years. In §V, we estimate overall costs that have
accompanied the latency improvement, and we discuss
the prospects for further development in this fast-moving
sub-segment of the financial industry.
II. LATENCY MEASUREMENT
Long-distance telecommunication of financial data is
relevant to equities, futures, options, foreign exchange,
news, and potentially other market data. We focus in this
paper on correlations between futures trading in Chicago
and equity trading and order book response in the New
York area exchanges. These correlations will give a rela-
tively direct measurement of the speed with which trad-
ing algorithms in New York are acting in response to
events in Chicago.
Our analysis is based on three sources of tick data. The
first source is market depth data for the E-Mini S&P 500
Futures contract purchased from the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange (CME)3. These data are recorded and times-
tamped at the Globex matching engine, currently located
in Aurora, Illinois (longitude -88.24◦ W, latitude 41.80◦
3 http://www.cmegroup.com/market-data/datamine-historical-
data/marketdepth.html
N). Session data is written to ASCII files using the FIX
format specification, and then compressed. Level-2 order
book activity to a price depth of 5 is captured, along with
trade records and other information relevant to recreat-
ing the trading session. All order book events are time
stamped to millisecond precision time signals propagated
from GPS receivers. The GPS system itself provides a
globally synchronized timeclock, accurate to of order 50
nanoseconds, tied to a reference frame that rotates with
the Earth and properly accounts for both special and
general relativistic time dilation; its accuracy is easily
sufficient for our purposes as long as the GPS time is
correctly propagated to the matching engine.
It is commonly stated that price formation in the
United States equity markets occurs in the near-month
E-Mini S&P 500 futures contract, which is traded at the
CME and valued at $50× the numerical value of the
S&P 500 Stock Index on the contract expiration date.
The E-mini contract trades on the March quarterly cycle
(March, June, September, and December) and expires on
the third Friday of the contract month. On the so-called
“roll date”, eight days prior to expiry, both liquidity and
price formation shift to the contract with the next-closest
expiry date. Several million E-mini contracts are traded
each day, corresponding to dollar volumes that frequently
exceed $200 billion.
Our second source of tick data is the NASDAQ
TotalView-ITCH historical data feed recorded at the
Nasdaq-OMX matching engine currently located in
Carteret, New Jersey (longitude -74.25◦ W, latitude
40.58◦ N). These data are composed of a series of bi-
nary number-format messages employing the ITCH 4.1
specification and encompass tick-by-tick information for
all displayable orders in the NASDAQ execution system
(see [15]). Messages are time-stamped to nanosecond pre-
cision.
The TotalView-ITCH historical data average
4.13GBday−1 after gzip compression. The total
size of the NASDAQ data used for this study is 2.33TB
compressed, and ∼20TB uncompressed. In Figure 1, we
plot the compressed file sizes for the full complement
of Nasdaq data (in GB) and the CME data (in units
of 0.02 GB to facilitate comparison). Over the period
covered by our analysis, the Nasdaq and CME messaging
volumes correlate very well, with the Nasdaq data rate
consistently running ∼ 50× higher than that from the
CME. The initial spike in the time series charted in
Figure 1 is associated with volatility surrounding the so-
called “Flash Crash” of May 6th, 2010. A second major
peak corresponds to the market volatility experienced in
August 2011.
A third, higher-level, source of tick data has been ob-
tained from the NYSE Technologies Market Data Cus-
tom Trade and Quote Services4, and consists of trades
4 http://www.nyxdata.com/Data-Products/Custom-TAQ/
4in the symbol SPY aggregated across the Consolidated
Market System, with price and trade size information
time-stamped to the millisecond. Although the NYSE
data presents a more coarse-grained, lower-resolution
view than the Nasdaq feed, it permits measurement of
the broader equity market response to activity at the
CME, and it is also useful for cross-checking analyses
that employ the Nasdaq historical feed.
Our data from the CME, Nasdaq, and NYSE cover 558
trading days that occurred between April 27th, 2010 and
August 17th, 2012, inclusive.
Changes in the traded price at the CME have a ma-
terial effect on the pricing of stocks at the New Jersey
exchanges. By correlating order book activity in the eq-
uity markets with traded E-mini upticks and downticks,
we can estimate the speed of information propagation be-
tween the exchanges, and chart its evolution over time.
We adopt the following procedures, which employ the
Nasdaq, NYSE, and CME tick data described above.
We first step through the CME trade and quote data
for a given day. At the end of each millisecond during the
period (9:30 AM ET through 4:00 PM ET) when both
the CME and the equity exchanges are trading, we screen
for the occurrence of near-month E-mini futures trades
in which the most recent traded price at the end of a mil-
lisecond interval (which we refer to as the “in-force” trade
for a given millisecond) exhibits an increase in price over
the most recent in-force trade from a previous millisec-
ond. On typical days during the period of our analysis,
such end-of-millisecond based price-increasing events oc-
cur about 10,000 times per day (or in about about one
out of every 2,000 individual millisecond intervals). In
a situation where the E-mini’s traded price experiences
rapid fluctuations within a millisecond interval, but the
in-force trade registers no net change, then our screen
registers no response.
When a millisecond interval that ends with a price-
increasing in-force CME trade has been identified, our
algorithm examines the Nasdaq historical feed for corre-
lated activity associated with a specified equity symbol.
For example, the SPY instrument (State Street Advi-
sors S&P 500 ETF) is a useful choice because it has very
high liquidity, and because by design, it closely tracks
the S&P 500 index. Alternately, any other correlated
or anti-correlated equity can be used. In each of the
30 millisecond-long intervals prior to, and in each of the
30 millisecond-long intervals following the CME price-
increasing trade, we calculate the net number of shares
that have been added to the bid side of the SPY limit
order book at the three price levels corresponding to (i)
the last Nasdaq exchange-traded SPY price, (ii) the last
Nasdaq exchange-traded SPY price + $0.01 , and (iii)
the last Nasdaq-traded price - $0.01. In addition, in each
of the same sixty millisecond-long bins surrounding the
CME event, we also calculate the net number of shares
that have been removed from the three levels of the ask
side of the SPY limit order book at prices correspond-
ing to the last Nasdaq-traded SPY price and that price
± $0.01. We then add δl =(added+removed) to an ar-
ray that maintains cumulative sums of these deltas as a
function of lag (from -30 ms to +30 ms).
The foregoing procedure is also followed for price-
decreasing in-force trades observed in the near-month E-
mini contract. In the case of these declines, however,
we add −1× δl to the array that maintains the cumula-
tive sums. This facilitates the combination of both price
increases and price decreases into a single estimator.
The resulting composite array of summed δ’s, with
each element divided by the total number of price-
changing E-mini trades, corresponds to what we will de-
note the measured “liquidity signal” for a given day. An
error estimate at each lag for a given day is calculated
using bootstrap resampling (e.g. [19]) over the observed
price-changing events. Although we generally consider
one-day intervals, finer or coarser-grained sampling can
be employed.
The solid, black curve in the left panel of Fig. 2 shows
the result of following the above-described correlation
procedure to compute liquidity responses for trading that
occurred on Feb 25th, 2012. This example trading day
was characterized by market volume that was typical of
daily volume averaged over the full 2010-2012 period cov-
ered by our analysis. Fig. 2 indicates for example, that
on average, during the 7th millisecond following a price-
changing trade at CME, there was a ∼800-share liquidity
response at the inner levels of the SPY limit order book
on the Nasdaq exchange. That is, on average, a price
increase at CME was met by high-frequency traders re-
moving ∼ 400 shares of SPY from the ask side of the
order book and adding ∼ 400 shares to the the bid side
of the limit order book.
Fig. 2 also shows liquidity responses for six additional
high-volume instruments traded on the Nasdaq exchange.
Three categories are represented. First, there are two eq-
uities with strong inverse correlation, that is, names with
large negative β’s in the language of portfolio theory.
These include SDS (βSDS = −1.78)
5, the ProShares Ul-
traShort S&P500 which uses derivative positions to seek
twice the inverse (-2x) the daily performance of the S&P
500 index, and VXX (βVXX = −2.69), the iPath S&P
500 VIX Short Term Futures ETN, which provides ex-
posure to a daily rolling long position in the first and
second month CME VIX futures contracts. Second, are
two equities – TLT (iShares Barclays 20+ Year Treasury
Bond ETF, βTLT = −0.29 and GLD (SPDR Gold Trust
ETF βGLD = −0.13) – chosen for their β values near
zero, and hence expectation for low correlation to short-
term price fluctuations in the E-mini. The third category
consists of AIG (American International Group common
shares βAIG = 3.43) and XLF (Financial Select Sector
5 All reported values for β were taken from Google Finance, ac-
cessed Oct. 1, 2012, and are intended here only for purposes of
rough comparison.
5FIG. 1: Compressed file sizes for NASDAQ and CME data during the April 27th, 2010 to August 17th, 2012 period covered by the
analysis are shown as purple and red dots, respectively. The data set comprises 558 individual trading days. Note that NASDAQ files are
consistently ∼ 50× larger than the FIX files supplied by the CME. For comparison, we also chart the SPY share price, the value of the
VIX index, both based on daily closing values, and the traded daily volume in SPY. File sizes are seen to be a generally good proxy for
the VIX index.
SPDR ETF βXLF = 1.49). These names were chosen for
a combination of high volume and high β.
The liquidity response functions charted in Figure 2
display a number of interesting features. Most impor-
tantly, the diagram illustrates that on average, there is
a highly significant liquidity response in the equity or-
der books to price-changing trades for the near-month
E-Mini contract at the CME. The response for an individ-
ual symbol can, in general, have two contributions. The
first, and apparently dominant, contribution is the arrival
of specific news from the CME that a price-changing E-
mini trade has occurred. The speed of this information
transfer cannot exceed the speed of light, c, which sets a
hard tmin = 3.93 ms minimum information propagation
time between Aurora, IL and Carteret, NJ. A second
contribution to the observed response signal will arise if
market participants in Carteret have a statistically signif-
icant ability to predict the occurrence of price-changing
trades at the CME, or if individual participants place
pre-coordinated orders in the physically separated mar-
kets. A consistent pattern of successful predictions (or
pre-coordinated activity) will generate measurable liq-
uidity shifts prior to the arrival of the actual news. As
discernible in Figure 2 and discussed further below, there
is unambiguous evidence for such a contribution to the
SPY response curve. Furthermore, it is clear that the
shapes of the response curves have a significant depen-
dence on β. The symbols SDS and SPY, which are most
closely tied to the E-mini future, react with large ampli-
tude and short response times. Somewhat surprisingly,
the largest integrated response among the six symbols is
observed for XLF. Although this equity is slower to re-
spond than SDS and SPY, its total integrated response is
both large and sustained, suggesting that (as of February
15, 2012) the XLF ETF provided important (and perhaps
not fully exploited) opportunities for high-frequency elec-
tronic market-making strategies.
The right panel of Figure 2 shows a very similar anal-
ysis except that rather than computing the change in
liquidity in response to price-changing E-Mini trades, we
compute the response for a selected equity (in this case,
SPY) in the form of price-changing trades (provided via
NYSE TAQ data for the US Consolidated Market Sys-
tem covering NASDAQ, NYSE Arca, NYSE, BATS BZX,
BATS BYX, EDGX, Nasdaq, CBSX, NSX, and CHX).
Specifically, when a millisecond is identified in which the
6FIG. 2: Left: Liquidity response evaluated for February 15th, 2012 at the Nasdaq matching engine (located in Carteret, New Jersey) to
price-changing trades in the near-month E-Mini future executed at the Globex platform in Aurora, Illinois. Full-day liquidity responses
(see text for methodology) are shown for SPY, XLF, and SDS, along with VXX, TLT, AIG, and GLD (with measured values for the latter
four securities multiplied by 10 in order to clarify the structure of the response). The two trading venues are separated by d = 1, 179 km.
The speed-of-light travel time between the two locations is t = c/d = 3.93 ms. Right: Trade response (see text for methodology) for SPY
as measured from Consolidated Market System data to price-changing E-Mini trades for February 15th, 2012.
in-force E-mini trade displays a price change from the
most recent in-force E-mini trade at the close of a previ-
ous millisecond, we look for near-coincident trades in a
particular symbol (here, SPY) on the consolidated mar-
ket system tape. In each of the 30 millisecond intervals
prior and following the CME event, if a price-changing
trade in the selected symbol has occurred, we add the
observed change in the traded price (δt) to an array
that maintains a cumulative sum of these deltas from
lag = 30 ms to lag = +30 ms. The resulting trade-trade
responses have larger error bars because most orders sub-
mitted to the matching engine (generating liquidity re-
sponse) do not actually result in fills (that generate a
trade response).
An important note regarding all of our response curves
is illustrated in Figure 3, which indicates that on aver-
age, given our methodology, and given the millisecond
resolution of the order book time stamps, an end-to-end
propagation time between N and N + 1 ms is reflected
in contributions to both bin N and to bin N + 1. In
the analysis of this paper, we do not attempt to gain in-
formation with sub-millisecond precision by tracking the
ordering among all of the messages that share the same
millisecond-resolution time stamp.
The statistical errors on several of the curves in Fig-
ure 2 are quite small, but even in these cases the day-
to-day variation significantly exceeds the error estimate
for the signal at each lag, so it is useful to accumulate
data over a number of days. The left panels of Figures 4
and 5 show the “liquidity” and “trade” response for SPY
accumulated over 6-month intervals, each containing ap-
proximately 125 trading days. These curves show a sig-
nificant changes over the past several years; to analyze
these changes it is useful to separate them into the curves’
relative amplitudes, shapes, and positions along the “lag”
axis.
The response amplitude can be quantified by integrat-
ing the total measured response for an equity symbol (as
plotted, for example in Figure 2) from t0=0 ms through
tf = 30 ms (or some other fixed point that is substan-
tially later than the bulk of the equity market response
to a CME price-changing trade), to give the total
T =
∫ tf
0
dP
dt
dt .
To examine shifts in the lag (which bear most directly
upon latency in communication), we can calculate the
time required to cover a specified fraction, X of the to-
tal response. For trade-trade response, we calculate the
latency, tt X such that
1
T
∫ tt X
0
dP
dt
dt = X ,
with an analogous estimate for tl X estimated from the
trade-liquidity response. In the above equation, linear
interpolation is used to numerically integrate over the
discretely sampled millisecond bins.
The right panels of Figures 4 and 5 panels show ag-
gregated responses as in the left panels, but in which for
7FIG. 3: An end-to-end propagation time between N and N + 1 ms is reflected in contributions to both bin N and to bin N + 1. Here,
for purposes of example, a hypothetical line travel time, t1 =4.85ms produces contributions to bins N and N + 1, with 85% of the signal
falling in the 5ms bin.
FIG. 4: SPY liquidity response measured at the Nasdaq to price-changing trades in the near-month E-Mini future. Left: Each point
on each curve represents the median of all data points for a given lag during a particular time period; the curves thus represent averaged
response curves over 6 month periods. Right: The same response curves, but each curve has been normalized so that it sums to unity
for lags of 0-20 ms, and also shifted so that its 50% response time is at Lag=0; these curves thus illustrate the change in shape of the
response, independent of scaling or time lag.
each day, the response curve has been divided by the to-
tal T , and shifted in time by the time tl50 at which 50% of
the response has accumulated. This allows a clear com-
parison of the shape of the response across the various
epochs.
These figures exhibit a number of interesting features.
Both trade and liquidity responses are composed of a
rapid rise over . 5ms, followed by a much more gradual
falloff over tens of ms (though the liquidity response’s rise
is generally faster and its falloff slower.) The curves have
evolved fairly differently, however, over the past several
years, with the trade signal retaining a nearly-constant
shape that has steadily shifted to lower latency, while the
liquidity signal has significantly broadened both before
and after its peak.
In interpreting these correlations we will make a few
core assumptions. The first is that the correlation arises
from the causal influence of CME price-changing trades
on the NY equity markets. In principle, as mentioned
above, a correlation can be created by a common cause
(such as orders being transmitted simultaneously or with
some time offset to both Chicago and NY markets),
though this would be an unlikely interpretation of the
bulk of the signal. The second is that the timestamps
included in the data accurately represent the time at
which a given order was placed or trade executed, as
provided by the globally synchronized clock of the GPS
system; this is warranted by the exchanges but difficult
for us to verify directly.6 All exchanges send fill messages
to participants before they report trades to the market
6 Inaccurate time-stamping can, of course, bias the inferred speed
of signal transmission; for an unfortunate and high-profile recent
example see, e.g. [5].
8FIG. 5: As in Fig. 4 but for the traded price response to the CME price-changing trades. In addition, the dashed line shows the same
analysis for the most recent epoch, using trades at the NASDAQ exchange only, as recorded in the ITCH4.1 data.
data tape. Depending on the load at the matching en-
gine and other factors, there is a potentially significant
and stochastic delay between the moment when a trade
is time stamped, and when it is published at the ex-
change gateway. It is therefore distinctly possible that
a sophisticated participant who receives a fill message
from the CME can bypass significant latency, drift, and
jitter, and send the information directly to the equity
exchanges. If this is the case, then the fact that only
one participant receives advance notice of a fill will act
to suppress the magnitude of the early response at the
equity exchanges in New Jersey, and, further, would have
very interesting consequences for the latency competition
between microwave networks.
Comparison of timestamps for identifiable trades
recorded by both the NASDAQ ITCH4.1 system and the
ARCA/CMS system indicate sub-ms overall offset, but
with 0-2 ms jitter in the relative time recorded; we will
attribute this to relative delay in processing orders be-
tween one system and the other, as the exchanges in-
cluded in the CMS are geographically separated by up
to d ≈ 50 km (& 250µ s by fiber). The response plotted
may thus represent the convolution of a “true” response
with a distribution with width of order 1ms; however,
assuming GPS accuracy of timestamps, this jitter should
never allow a New York response to a Chicago event to
be recorded prior to the actual propagation time. In-
deed, as shown in Figure 5, the trade response using
the ITCH4.1 system (dashed lines) is quite consistent
with that of the ARCA/CMS system in the most recent
epoch. (Similar curves for other periods are also broadly
similar, though sub-ms lateral offsets in both directions
appear for some epochs; these may reflect actual changes
in trading amongst different exchanges, but we do not
analyze this in detail here.)
Under these assumptions, we can see that both signals
show no significant evidence for information propagation
faster than 7ms in the earliest dates, but have seen a
downward shift in response time of ∼ 3 ms since. This
shift can be attributed to two potential causes.
First, decreases in actual communications latency, will
drive the signal toward the light-travel time of 3.93ms,
which is the fundamental limit to a direct causal signal
between the CME and the NJ matching engines.7
Second, if a trading algorithm can predict (on the ba-
sis, for example, of changes to the balance of contracts
on bid and offer in the E-Mini order book) when a price-
changing trade will occur, and trade on the basis of that
prediction, this will appear as a contribution to the signal
that can occur prior to the 3.93ms limit. Such a signal
is, in fact, evident in both the trade and liquidity signals
starting in 2012. Figure 6 shows the early part of the
trade response with 95% confidence intervals plotted as
error bars; these are based on bootstrap resampling of
the daily data points aggregated into each lag bin.
While it is difficult to disentangle improvements in pre-
diction (or, alternately, an increase in order coordination)
from improvements in communication latency, the evo-
lution of these curves strongly suggests both processes
are taking place. As described in the next section, the
high value of short response time to information from the
CME has led to significant investment in faster commu-
nication channels via microwave.
7 It is amusing to note that even a signal beamed directly through
the Earth (see, e.g. [22]) could cut only ∼ 1 km, or ∼ 3µs from
this latency.
9FIG. 6: As in Fig. 5 but showing only Lag=0-6ms, and with 95%
confidence intervals shown. Of note, there is a highly statistically
significant rise prior to 4ms appearing in late 2011/early 2012, and
growing subsequently. A similar signal can be seen in the liquidity
response curves (not shown.)
III. MICROWAVE NETWORKS
The speed of electromagnetic information transmis-
sion through air, including microwave (MW) at ∼ 103 −
105MHz, occurs a factor of 1/n faster than in fiber of re-
fractive index n. Long-distance MW networks can more-
over be significantly straighter (closer to the geodesic
path between the two endpoints) than fiber networks be-
cause MW paths can also travel over small bodies of wa-
ter and other regions in which it is difficult to lay fiber.
Thus MW networks can in principle offer significantly
lower latencies than fiber on overland routes.
To be successful, however, such networks must over-
come several technical obstacles:
• Commercially available digital MW radios are a
mature and highly efficient technology (operating
close to the Shannon limit), but have generally been
optimized primarily for reliability, throughput, and
cost, but not latency. Nearly all MW radios on the
market as of 2010 therefore added a latency Lrad
of many tens or even thousands of microseconds of
latency per MW hop.
• Private MW networks in the US are limited to par-
ticular channels, predominantly 30 or 40 MHz chan-
nels in the 5925-6875 MHz and 10700-11700 MHz
bands.8 Use of this limited frequency space is gov-
8 Higher-frequency channels are available, but susceptible to sig-
erned by an FCC licensing process that constrains
the bit rate, power, modulation, and other charac-
teristics of MW data channels; obtaining the req-
uisite licenses can be difficult in congested regions
(as described below, the NY-Chicago corridor as a
whole has become such a region.)
• MW networks are susceptible to outage due to
propagation effects such as multi-path interference,
rain fades, and significant variations in the atmo-
spheric refractivity gradient, as well as equipment
and power failure, and physical damage to radios
or MW towers. Commercial networks can nonethe-
less achieve very high (99.999+%) uptime; however,
this entails a conservative and redundant design
strategy generally requires a tradeoff with both bit
rate and latency.
The next section describes the basic physics and engi-
neering considerations for long-distance low-latency MW
networks; we then discuss existing and planned financial
data networks in light of these considerations.
A. Design considerations for latency-optimized
MW networks.
Consider an N−hop MW network of total length Dtot
between endpoints A and B running at frequency f . The
achievable hop length (which determines N) is limited
primarily by Earth’s curvature, and secondarily by relia-
bility considerations. The curvature constraint arises be-
cause the microwave path must clear the Earth as well as
obstructions of height hobs by approximately one Fresnel-
zone width hfres, and the Earth’s curved surface can be
treated as a ‘bulge’ of height hEarth that a straight-line
path must clear. At the midpoint of a hop of length D,
we have
hfres ≃ 8.7m
(
D
1 km
)1/2(
f
1GHz
)
−1/2
and
hEarth ≃
1
50
m
(
D
1 km
)2
K−1,
where K accounts for the gradient of the atmospheric re-
fractive index, which effectively multiplies the Earth’s
radius by a factor K. (For this and other standard
equations in microwave engineering, see e.g., Ref. [13].)
Assuming tower of height htow . 100m, f ≈ 6GHz,
K < 4/3, and hobs & 10m, the constraint that htow >
nificant rain outage; at lower frequencies it is difficult to obtain
a large enough frequency channel free of interference to sustain
high data rates.
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hfres + hEarth + hobs requires D . 70 km over flat ter-
rain. (Intervening terrain peaks and valleys can increase
or decrease this number, and it is also limited by tower
availability, but this is a fairly accurate estimate, as well-
planned networks spanning the ∼ 1200km between New
York and Chicago data centers require & 20 hops.)
For a MW network to provide a significant advan-
tage over fiber of refractive index n along the same
path requires that the equipment latency Lrad satisfy
D/c + Lrad ≪ nD/c, or L ≪ 100µs if n ≈ 1.4. Al-
though not common until recently, this is easily achiev-
able. Microwave radios utilizing 30-40MHz channels and
64-256QAM modulation run at a bit rate of ∼ 140− 190
Mbps. Digital radio latency is dominated by (a) forward
error correction (FEC) that buffers typically 32-256 bytes
of data, (b) interleaving data to increase the effectiveness
of this FEC for bursty errors, and (c) ethernet switches
that buffer ∼ 64− 1024byte ethernet packets. Buffering
and reading out B bytes at bit rate B˙ requires
L = 10.24 (B/64 bytes)(B˙/100Mbps)−1 µs.
Thus, once the interleaver is removed, radios with FEC
and ethernet packets can achieve L ∼(tens) of µs. Radios
optimized for latency with these removed are advertised
at L < 10µs, and there is no barrier in principle to radios
with L . 1µs. (Moreover, analog microwave repeaters
exist and can amplify and retransmit a data stream with
latency L≪ 1µs.)
Along with the radio latency and hop number, a MW
path’s overall latency is determined by the path length.
As the Earth is spherical to good approximation, the
shortest distance geodesic path along its surface is ap-
proximately a geodesic of length Dgeo. The ‘excess dis-
tance’ Dex that a path requires relative to this geodesic
distance is determined by terrain (such as bodies of wa-
ter), availability of towers, and skill in constructing a
string of rentable (or buildable) towers with proper clear-
ances and available frequencies. Contributions to Dex
arise due to the change in heading δα between two suc-
cessive MW hops. By simple geometry, for a two-hop
network9 with δα ≪ 1 and hop length D ≪ REarth, the
contribution δDex is given by δDex/D ≃ (δα)
2/8. Re-
latedly, in a hypothetic two-hop route the perpendicular
excursion from the geodesic is of order ∼
√
DtotDex/2.
(This indicates that, for example, a 1200 km route can
deviate by ≈ 70 km north or south of the geodesic while
maintaining Dex . 10 km.) Thus there is some latitude
in the gross path of a low-latency MW route, but care
must be taken to minimize the relative azimuths between
successive hops.
To summarize, a MW route carries an ‘excess latency’
Lex beyond the theoretically possible overland latency of
9 A three-hop network with three equal hops and two successive
azimuth changes of the same magnitude but opposite sign, the
result is δDex/D ≃ (δα)2/4, and a general network with azimuth
changes ≈ α should generally lie in this range.
≃ Dgeo/C of
Lex = NLrad +Dex/c,
where from the considerations above, and by comparison
with deployed routes (see below), N ∼ Dtot/(30−60 km),
Lrad ∼ 1−20µs, andDex ∼ (0.001−0.01)Dtot. This leads
to a range of
Lex ≈ 60− 1200µs
along the NY-Chicago route. For reference, the
currently-fastest fiber route requires > 6.55ms,10 or a
latency excess of Lex & 2700µs between the CME and
Nasdaq matching engines.
B. Existing and planned Chicago-NY MW
networks
Although firms constructing MW networks for finan-
cial data transmission generally do not broadcast the de-
tails of their activities, all operating MW links in the
FCC licensed bands must legally disclose the details of
their links to the FCC via its licensing system, and that li-
cense information publicly available. Using software tools
we have developed to parse this database, we have been
able to reconstruct the routes of 15 full MW routes with
licenses either granted or applied for by September 1,
2012.11
These routes are and listed in Table III B and il-
lustrated in Figure III B. The table lists the routes in
chronological order of the first applied-for license.12 The
“registered licensee” is generally a company spawned
in order to separate the route from the identity of its
user/operator, though some do correspond to publicly
disclosed carriers. Total and route distances Dtot and
Dgeo are computed between the endpoints of the MW
route, though the information channel may continue by
other technologies such as fiber, free-space optical, or
other RF channels for short distances beyond these end-
points, to connect to data centers. We also neglect
path length due to cabling between radios at each tower,
which adds on average ≈ 150m and ≈ 0.75µm per tower
(assuming a signal speed of 0.66 c in the cabling), or
10 This latency is quoted from 350 E. Cermak Road (longitude -
87.62◦ W, latitude 41.85◦ N) in Chicago to data centers in NJ;
the current CME data center in Aurora IL is ∼ 60 km more
distant.
11 Note that such routes are subject to modification by new or re-
vised licenses, so this is a snapshot of a fluid picture. Moreover,
some routes take multiple paths for some segments, and termi-
nate at several different data centers; where possible we have
assumed the shortest path for our estimates.
12 Note that this does not necessarily correspond to the order in
which the routes have come into operation – indeed, a number
are almost certainly still under construction.
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FIG. 7: Top: Fifteen microwave routes between Chicago and NJ data centers with licenses or license applications in the FCC
6 and, 11, and 18 GHz bands as of September 1, 2012. Routes are labeled by the legal entity that submitted the application;
order and color is by increasing latency as computed in Table IIIB. Bottom: 7,700 example routes planned across existing
towers with valid clearances. All of these are shorter than all existing MW links, showing that current routes are generally far
from optimal in communicating information at low latency.
≈ 3 − 12 km and ≈ 15 − 60µs over a route. To esti-
mate total latency excess ∆Lex, we have provided figures
for a fiducial value of Lrad = 10µs; other values
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be obtained by scaling the “equipment latency” column
by Lrad/(10µs) and adding to the “distance latency” LD
column. The final column lists the maximal licensed bit
rate in Mbps. Most routes are licensed for several mod-
ulation rates, and some for several frequency channels;
we list the total throughput combining all channels at
maximum bit rate. All distance figures are in km, and
all latencies in µs.
Several more networks (“China Cat Productions”,
“Pitt Power LLC”, “Converge Towers, LLC”) are par-
tially licensed, and several additional networks are in
earlier stages of licensing. In addition, multiple networks
exist connecting the Chicago area to Washington, DC,
and Washington, DC to the NJ data centers, as can be
discerned from Fig. 10 below.
These routes all show a significant latency advantage
relative to even a custom-built fiber route, with one-way
latencies generally < 5ms. (Note that in terms of the
listed quantities, Lmin ≡ Dgeo/c + Lex represents the
total one-way latency between endpoints for the given
Lrad. However, this is not directly comparable between
routes with different endpoints, and comparison with fi-
nancial data requires estimates of latency between these
endpoints and the data center data servers.) These routes
are, however, far lower in data throughput – even the to-
13 FCC records also list the radios used in a given link; however
latency figures for these radios are generally confidential.
tal combined bit rate of ≃ 3.4 Gbps for all 15 networks
is far below the Tbps carried by fiber routes.
The licensed routes exhibit very significant spread in
“excess” latency, by a factor of five, even under the same
assumed latency per radio. This indicates both that these
routes are generally far from optimal given the available
tower and frequency resources, and that at present ‘skill’
at minimizing these azimuth differences (and maximizing
D for each hop) is the prime determinant of path length
along the NY-Chicago route. This is perhaps unsurpris-
ing given that conventional hop-by-hop planning of MW
routes is poorly suited to solving a global optimization
problem of this sort. Suppose, for example, that an N -
hop route is constructed by iteratively choosing the tower
with a live link in closest to the correct direction. If each
tower has on average nnear live links to nearby towers of
distance ∼ Dtot/N , then each link is typically forced to
deviate by an amount δα ∼ pi/nnear, resulting in
Dex ∼
1
4
(
pi
nnear
)2
Dtot.
The range ofDex/Dtot exhibited by typical networks sug-
gests nnear ∼ 5− 10 through the parts of the path domi-
nating Dex, and this value agrees with estimates of tower
density based on FCC data (see Fig. 10 below).
Far better results can be achieved by planningM links
at a time: allowing, for example, a choice between the two
towers nearest the right direction gives on average 50%
greater δα; but now there are four chances to line up the
azimuths of the first and second hops. These combina-
toric factors add up quickly, so a global optimization of
the path length yields far better results. To examine in
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Registered Licensee # files First file N Dgeo Dtot Dex LD NLrad Lex Mbps
AB Services 43 9/22/10 18 1140 1269 129 430 180 610 2× 155
Auburn Data Systems 98 12/11/10 40 1186 1224 38 127 400 527 164
Thought Transmissionsa 213 12/23/10 81 1104 1226 122 406 810 1216 135
Appalachian Broadcasting 63 6/28/11 26 1128 1211 83 260 277 539 2× 191
SW Networks 219 8/2/11 77 1190 1340 150 500 770 1270 139
Webline Holdings 89 9/29/11 32 1186 1200 14 47 320 367 191
Newgig Networks 73 10/5/11 37 1135 1210 75 250 370 620 2× 139
World Class Wireless 386b 10/7/11 30 1184 1241 60 200 300 500 167
Jefferson Microwave 91 8/17/11 20 1187 1195 9 30 200 230 2× 165
Coralinks 91 11/15/11 33 1180 1236 56 188 330 518 139
High Voltage Commun. 134 2/28/12 25 1179 1232 53 177 250 427 2× 167
TRF Services 77 3/7/12 31 1179 1255 76 253 310 563 167
MVC Research 38 3/23/12 36 1165 1224 59 197 360 557 167
Velox Networks 44 3/30/12 37 1155 1247 92 306 370 677 139
Zen Networks 117 11/22/11 31 1179 1188 9 30 310 340 2× 191
aThis route is licensed by three separate entities: “Thought
Transmissions”, “Fundamental Broadcasting” and “Comprehen-
sive Wireless”
bThis figure includes applications for other routes including
Chicago-Washington DC.
detail how optimal a path could be planned, we have run
numerical experiments by identifying ‘live’ links between
existing towers in the Chicago-NJ corridor, and found the
lowest-latency possible path achievable using the tops of
all existing towers; this turns out to be an extremely short
Dex ∼ 0.2 km. However, realistically not all heights on
all towers will be available.14 We therefore developed a
probability model for the availability of both towers of
different types, and heights on towers, calibrated via in-
quiries to tower companies for a sample of towers.15 As
exhibited in Fig. III B, even with realistic (and probably
conservative) probabilities, paths of N ≈ 19 − 24 and
Dex ≈ 4 − 10 km are routinely achievable, yielding far
lower latencies than most extant networks (although the
best of these, Jefferson Microwave and Zen Networks, at
least approach the upper end of the Dex range.) This,
along with the large range in existing routes, indicates
that at present the primary determinant of MW path la-
tency is the sophistication (or lack thereof) in route plan-
ning, and that convergence toward lower-latency routes
can and probably will occur in the future. In particular,
given radios or repeaters of < 2 − 3µs average latency,
a path with Lex < 100µs could quite plausibly be con-
structed, perhaps as an upgrade of an existing path to
help with frequency or tower-congested areas.
14 In addition, frequency space between Chicago and NJ is becom-
ing quite crowded. While this did not hinder early networks, it
is likely to be a key constraint in future ones.
15 Thanks to D. Levine for assistance in this project.
IV. CORRELATING INFORMATION
PROPAGATION WITH THE FINANCIAL DATA
It is of substantial interest to know how the line-time
between Chicago and New York available to various trad-
ing firms has evolved in response to investments in com-
munication infrastructure. In the previous section, we
discussed how external estimates of the Chicago to New
York latency can be made by reconstructing microwave
routes from the database of FCC licenses, coupled with
estimates of the associated radio equipment, last mile,
and exchange-associated latencies. A difficulty with this
approach is that the existence of an FCC license does
not mean that a particular link is actually functioning,
making it hard to know whether a particular route is
transmitting data; it is also impossible from such data to
determine how many firms are using each such route.
A correlation analysis of the exchange-provided tick
data, such as developed in Sec. II, demonstrates the ef-
fects of networks that are actually operating, but there
are several factors that make it difficult to determine the
precise latency of information transport. In particular,
the construction of a single latency statistic that is si-
multaneously compelling and accurate is affected by sev-
eral factors, including (1) the diversity of both firms and
strategies that are combined in the amalgamated mar-
ket response; (2) the a-causal “pre-signal”, which occurs
when market participants are consistently able to pre-
dict and anticipate the price movements of a given se-
curity before they occur, or when they are able to coor-
dinate issuance of orders at different exchanges accord-
ing to a pre-defined schedule; (3) substantial day-to-day
variation in market response to exogenous shocks, which
we attribute to the effect of evolving algorithmic trading
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strategies, and possible non-stationary systematic delays
between the time stamping of trades and their appear-
ance on the data feed at the exchange gateway (rather
than random noise); and (4) strong evolution of both vol-
ume and the overall shape of the response curve over the
past several years.
To some degree, some of these effects could in prin-
ciple be partially disentangled using additional levels of
analysis, and/or using data that is not available to us
(such as the identity of firms originating each order, or
a data feed that is independently time stamped at the
exchange gateway.) For purposes of this paper we have
settled on two sets of measures. The time evolution of the
statistics tl X and ttX as defined in Sec. II can be used
to sample the market evolution. The upper-left panels
of figures 8 and 9 show these quantities for X = 5%,
X = 15%, and X = 50% for the trade-liquidity response
and the trade-trade response respectively. We compute
a second latency measure by computing, for time t > t0,
the accumulated significance of a detectable response: we
compute both the integrated response T (t) from t0 to t,
and the uncertainty σT in this quantity, computed by
summing the 1σ uncertainties in quadrature for the bins
at earlier times. We then take T/σT as a measure of
response significance; and (via linear interpolation) de-
termine the time t(σ) at which this significance reaches a
number σ of standard deviations. These times are plot-
ted in the lower-left panels of figures 8 and 9, with t(3σ)
and t(5σ) plotted for the trade response, and 5, 10, and
25σ responses plotted for the liquidity data. This mea-
sure gives both insight into the latency evolution, and
also an indication of the per-day statistical significance
of detecting a signal at a given latency.
Examining these quantities reveals a substantial day-
to-day variation in all of them; this variation greatly ex-
ceeds the statistical error on the data points (particularly
in the liquidity response, which has small uncertainties),
and likely points to shifting players, strategies, matching
engine load at the CME, and other factors. Nonetheless,
clear trends in the response can be discerned, and these
can be compared with known external events affecting
market response times. First, there is an overall down-
ward trend in all “leading edge” indicators, namely tl 5,
tt 5, t(3σ) for trades, and t(5σ) for liquidity. In agree-
ment with the results in Fig. 5, these trends hold also
for tt 15 and tt 50, indicating that the overall shape of the
trade response is relatively constant, while its response
time has steadily shifted to lower latency. In contrast,
while the leading edge of the liquidity signal has shifted
to lower response time, the tl 50 has increased, indicating
that the response has significantly broadened even while
the leading edge has shifted to lower latency.
During the time of our data sample, a number of known
external events potentially affecting latency occurred;
some of these are indicated in Figures 8 and 9. Prior
to summer/fall 2010, the fastest communication route
connecting the Chicago futures markets (with point of
presence at Equinix’s 350 E. Cermak data center) to the
New Jersey equity markets allowed a response 7.25-7.95
ms after a price change in Chicago [1]. This is in accord
with Figures 8 and 9, which show first responders in the
7 and 8 ms bin.
In August of 2010, Spread Networks introduced a
new custom fiber optic line that was shorter than the
pre-existing route and used lower latency equipment.
This technology reduced latency between 350 Cermak
and Verizon’s Carteret Data Center that houses the
NASDAQ matching engine, with the lowest-latency ser-
vice running at a quoted 6.65ms (recently reduced to
6.55ms.) In Figures 8 and 9, one can discern a latency
drop of ≈ 1−1.5ms near this time. Note that around this
time, the CME group moved its matching engine from
350Cermak to its new Aurora data center, presumably
adding a sub-ms latency between this matching engine
and the NJ data centers (in principle, the fiber commu-
nication time between these points can be < 250µs, but
we have no data as to the actual latency introduced.)
According to FCC records, in Fall 2010 the first clan-
destine MW route became fully licensed. A MW route
with expedited construction can probably be assembled
in 6-12 months after the licensing process begins. Un-
der this running (and very approximate) assumption, one
MW route may have been operating in early 2011, fol-
lowed by several more in mid/late 2011, and up to a half-
dozen as of spring/summer 2012. Each of these routes
may serve one or more trading firms. In Figures 8 and 9
there is a gradual decrease in latency, with the first re-
sponse dropping from 6-7ms in Fall 2010 to 3-4ms as of
August 2012. We attribute this steady latency decrease
to the construction, commissioning, and adoption of mi-
crowave data transmission by numerous firms during this
period.
Also of note is a possibly significant downward latency
drop in late January 2012. On January 29, 2012, CME-
provided co-location moved from 350 Cermak to the Au-
rora data center. For MW paths terminating in Aurora,
this potentially cut out a round-trip . 0.5ms path from
Aurora (where the matching was occurring) to 350 Cer-
mak (where CME allowed colocation) back to Aurora
(where the MW network began). Another significant de-
crease occurred in early July 2012. It is possible that this
is connected with the launch of a particular network used
by multiple players that was able to significantly shift the
response time.
V. ESTIMATED COSTS AND RELATION TO
US TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INFRASTRUCTURE
The development of Spread Networks’ fiber link is
publicly estimated to have cost approximately $300 mil-
lion [23], exclusive of substantial operating costs, both for
Spread Networks and for the users; for example, traders
who lease dark fiber pairs incur an additional cost of
lighting their link so that it can convey information be-
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FIG. 8: Upper left: Evolution of the X = 5%, X = 15%, and X = 50% liquidity response estimates – see text in Sec. II for definitions.
Curved are obtained via 10-day median filtering of individual days (points). Bottom left: Evolution of the accumulated significance
measures, t(5σ), t(10σ), and t(25σ) for the liquidity response. Right: All of the volume-normalized liquidity response curves from the
N = 600 analyzed days in the form of a heat map. The intensity scale runs from dark blue (zero response) to white (maximum response).
The shaded region in the left panel shows the relative total integrated response T for each day, by which the daily response is normalized
in the right panel.
tween the markets.
We can roughly estimate the capital and recurring
expense of the ongoing MW network effort as follows.
Turnkey installation of a commercial MW hop, includ-
ing equipment, path engineering, site and path surveys,
frequency coordination and licensing, tower work, in-
stallation, and commissioning, total of order $100,000-
$250,000. Because this market segment can involve
customized equipment and more proprietary capabili-
ties than for more general-purpose MW builds, costs are
likely to be closer to the high end of this estimate. Given
a total of 554 links in Table III B, this suggests a CapEx
expense significantly exceeding ∼ $139 million; this does
not include a number of networks in less-advanced stages
of their build, networks that may not show up in the FCC
database, or other costs.
Operating costs for a MW network can be estimated
starting with the generally dominant cost of tower lease
costs. A “rule of thumb” for such costs in this region
is ∼$100/vertical antenna foot/month. (Mike Hunter,
RCC Consultants, Private Communication). Assuming
two 8-foot antennas per link, the 554 links in Table III B
represent ∼ $10myr−1. Other operating costs such as
power, maintenance, network operating centers, etc., are
likely to roughly double this cost. Thus over five years
OpEx adds approx. $100 million, for a total of approx.
$250 million over five years for the MW effort even if no
additional networks are deployed and networks outside
of the NY-Chicago corridor are neglected.
An interesting implication of these estimates as com-
bined with the findings of Sec. III is that lower-latency
MW networks are generally less expensive than slower
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FIG. 9: Upper left: Evolution of the X = 5%, X = 15%, and X = 50% trade response estimates – see text in Sec. II for definitions.
Bottom left: Evolution of the accumulated significance measures, t(3σ), and t(5σ) for the trade response. Right: All of the volume-
normalized liquidity response curves from the N = 600 analyzed days in the form of a heat map. The intensity scale runs from dark blue
(zero response) to white (maximum response). The shaded region in the top left panel shows the relative total total trade response in
dollars for the period following the CME trades; that in the bottom left shows the total integrated trade response T for each day, by which
the daily response is normalized in the right panel.
networks, because the prime factor in both latency and
cost for current networks is the number of hops. For
example, at $250,000/hop, there is a range from $4.5m-
$20m in the approximate cost of currently-licensed net-
works, but the fastest networks are at the low end of the
spectrum, and the slowest at the high end; similar con-
siderations apply for operating expenses as well. Thus as
well as the latency, the cost of networks has been largely
determined by the skill in their planning. It also implies
that future networks competing or surpassing the current
best could cost relatively little in capital expense, most
likely . $5-8m.
The MW networks being deployed for financial data
transmission have by some measures become a non-
negligible component of the U.S. wireless network indus-
try. Figure 10 shows a map of the two years prior to
September 1, 2012, in microwave site-based FCC appli-
cations. The Chicago-New York-Washington triangle is
clearly visible. During this period, approximately 94,000
paths totaling 1.3 million km were applied for;16 of this,
at least 1422 paths totaling ∼ 51,606 km appear related
to financial data networks on the Chicago-NJ route. The
Chicago-NJ networks utilize approx. 490 unique towers,
from of order 190,000 that appear in the FCC database,
19,000 of which lie within the 2-degree latitude swathe
running between Chicago and NJ. The effort has also
16 Note that these figures count each direction and each frequency of
a MW link separately; the number of applications can exceed the
number of paths for various reasons including revisions, updates,
etc.
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FIG. 10: A map of 93,600 paths present in 187,338 microwave site-based license applications for the two years prior to September
1, 2012 (left) and of 191,290 towers culled from the FCC database (right). Colors indicate frequency bands: 6 GHz (black), 11
GHz (charcoal), 18 GHz (dark gray), and other (slate gray).
spurred significant technological investment. On the ba-
sis of the FCC and other data we estimate that in the
space of two years, at least thirteen MW radio manufac-
turers have developed customized equipment aimed at
the low-latency segment.
This infrastructure has presumably been motivated by
greater profits accessible to traders with access to lower
latency links. We can use our data sets to make an ex-
ample point estimate of the relationship between returns
and latency by examining the record of SPY trading dur-
ing the April 27th, 2010 – August 17th, 2012 time frame.
Changes in the traded price of the near-month E-mini
contract at the CME generate substantial (and accu-
rately measurable) increases in trading volume for the
SPY ETF. On average, during the full period spanned
by our analysis, 15% of all SPY trades (amounting to
VCME→SPY = 20 billion shares) can be specifically iden-
tified as excess volume associated with the HFT response
to E-mini price moves. The trading rate for SPY in-
creases by a factor of ∼ 30× when the E-mini ticks up
or down. Sharp increases in SPY trading volume begin
when the news of an E-mini price changes reaches the
New Jersey exchanges, and the rate of excess trading dis-
plays a time-dependent behavior that closely tracks the
trade-trade response functions discussed in §2. On av-
erage, during the period of our analysis, the E-mini was
priced at $65,000, with a $12.5 bid-offer spread, whereas
shares of SPY were priced at $130, with a $0.01 mini-
mum spread. Given that the two instruments are fungi-
ble into each other, a one-tick move for the E-mini corre-
sponds to a (1.25×101/6.5×104)×$130 = $0.025 move-
ment in SPY. Therefore, the total PnL, PSPY, specifically
attributable to latency improvement for the VCME→SPY
traded shares is of order PSPY ∼ (2.0 × 10
10 sh.) ×
$0.025 sh.−1 = $0.5 billion, a figure that, interestingly,
is of the same order as the investment in low latency
infrastructure between Chicago and New Jersey. (These
estimates can be extended to other equities with identical
methodology, but this data is not reported here.) Using
our data, we can calculate, for a given trading period,
the one-way latency, Lf required to capture a given frac-
tion, f , of PSPY. We find, for example, that during the
period covered by our analysis, L0.95 has dropped from
L0.95 = 8ms to L0.95 = 5ms.
Positional competition at the sub-millisecond level is,
however, more complex than this simple example sug-
gests. Although algorithms will, in general, yield higher
returns at lower latency, the tradeoff between return and
latency is likely a complex function of the algorithm,
competing algorithms, and the spread of latencies among
competitors.
VI. DISCUSSION
The evolution of the inter-market latency between the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the New Jersey-based
equity exchanges serves as an interesting example of the
development of ever-faster infrastructure for securities
trading. The speed of information transport between
Chicago and New York has decreased significantly during
the past three years, which we attribute to the launch of
an optimized fiber optic link, the emergence of line-of-
sight microwave networks connecting the financial cen-
ters, and the increased presence of trading algorithms in
the equity markets that are able to either pre-coordinate
orders across exchanges or to anticipate price movements
in the futures markets. In the latter case, the coordi-
nation of trades across different exchanges is already a
technological challenge; the incredibly low latencies that
may evolve over coming years may also quite soon start
to involve higher-order relativistic effects, and challenge
even the GPS system’s ability to define and maintain
a sufficiently accurate globally synchronized time frame
required for such coordinated orders to be effective.
We have found that the latency measurements derived
from our analysis of exchange-provided financial tick data
are broadly consistent with the inferred properties of
the licensed microwave networks that appear in publicly
available FCC records. Our analysis, furthermore, pro-
vides strong support for the hypothesis that price for-
mation for the United States equity market occurs in
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the near-month E-Mini S&P 500 Futures contract. As a
consequence, changes in the traded price of the E-Mini
contract provide a continuous sequence of small exoge-
nous shocks, to which the US equity markets respond
in a time-averaged manner that is both predictable over
a timescale of order τlat = 10ms and is highly statisti-
cally significant. Our identification of this predictabil-
ity, along with the demonstration that the CME acts
as a drive system with the equity exchanges acting as
response systems, raises the intriguing possibility that
ideas related to the synchronization of chaos and Lya-
punov characteristic exponents (see, e.g. [2]) might have
applicability to the characterization of market behavior.
In this regard, we speculate that “dissipation” in a mar-
ket viewed as a dynamical system can be identified with
the noise trading provided by retail orders, and that the
Lyapunov time, τL, is of order τL ∼ τlat ∼ 10ms, as mea-
sured by the exponential decay observed in our response
curves over this time scale. If this view has merit, then
the equity exchanges display a dramatic contrast in their
Lyapunov time scale to that shown by Earth’s weather,
which exhibits predictability over periods measured in
days [12], and to Earth’s orbital motion, which can be
predicted accurately for millions of years, but which be-
comes completely unknowable on time scales exceeding
τ ∼ 100Myr [10].
It is remarkable that – as demonstrated in this pa-
per – an appreciable fraction of the entire U.S. equities
market responds, about once per second, to just a few
bits of information emanating from suburban Chicago
and traveling via various channels and between 4-10 mil-
liseconds, to suburban New Jersey. This fact makes the
ability to access those bits as fast as possible worth ten
or hundreds of millions of dollars per year. This is per-
haps an unusual case, resulting from the geographic sep-
aration of the dominant U.S. futures and equities mar-
kets. Nonetheless the expenditures being made to re-
duce latency over other international financial centers.
For example, the 7,800 km Asia Submarine Cable Ex-
press, linking the Singapore and Tokyo markets, recently
opened. It reportedly cost approximately $430 million
and reduces latency over that route by 3 ms [7]. A sim-
ilar ∼$300 million, 6021km cable project underway by
Hibernia will reduce the New York-London latency by
∼ 6ms [26], and a trans-polar fiber route, with reported
estimated cost of $1.2 billion has been launched that will
reduce the Asia-Europe communication time by tens of
milliseconds[8] indicate that similar financial incentives
exist on various routes worldwide.
This has led to an interesting physics and technology
problem, of how a given bit rate of information can be
communicated as quickly as possible between widely sep-
arated points. The current answer appears to be via
microwave networks overland, and via fiber optic cables
undersea. How this will evolve in the future depends
on a number of factors, including those in the regula-
tory space not addressed here. In the short term, it is
likely that MW and fiber networks will continue to be fur-
ther latency-optimized (perhaps, for example, including
hollow-core fibers in which information travels at the vac-
uum speed of light.) Other, physically well-understood
but less robust technologies such as floating microwave
stations or drones may come into play. In the distant
future, we can speculate that exotic technologies such as
neutrino or even WIMP, axion or gravity wave communi-
cations could be employed to communicate financial tick
data directly through the Earth.
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